The first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study were analysed with respect to the role of the oxygen analyser; 27 (1%) were first detected by the oxygen analyser. All of these were amongst the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with general anaesthesia, of which 48% were "human detected" and 52% "monitor detected': The oxygen analyser was ranked 7th and detected 4% of these monitor detected incidents. This figure would have been much higher had the oxygen analyser been correctly used on more occasions.
an anaesthetic machine is in use. 2 This is also highly recommended in the" International Standards for the Safe Practice of Anaesthesia" . 3 The advent of pulse oximetry and the widespread availability of piped anaesthetic gases has led to a degree of complacency amongst anaesthetists about monitoring the inspired oxygen concentration. However, relying on a fall in oxygen saturation to detect a hypoxic mixture leaves little time to correct a problem that can very rapidly culminate in brain damage or death. Meticulous monitoring of the inspired oxygen concentration will inform the anaesthetist about the nature of the problem much earlier, allowing appropriate corrective measures to be taken before a fall in the oxygen content of the patient's blood.
It was decided to examine the first 2000 incidents reported to the Australian Incident Monitoring Study (AIMS) to obtain an objective indication of the appplications and limitations of the oxygen analyser in clinical anaesthetic practice.
METHODS

Actual Incident Detection
Information of relevance to the oxygen analyser was extracted from the first 2000 incidents reported to AIMS. AIMS involves the voluntary, anonymous reporting of any unintended incident which reduced, or could have reduced, the safety margin for the patient. Details of the AIMS methods are provided elsewhere in this symposium. 4 All incident reports were studied: -with the key words "oxygen analyser" and/or "hypoxic gas mixture"; -in which the oxygen analyser was reported to have been the first monitor to detect an incident; -in which the oxygen analyser was deemed to have failed when it would otherwise have been expected to be useful.
Also, all information of relevance to the oxygen analyser was extracted from the paper in this symposium in which the role of monitors in patients undergoing general anaesthesia was examined. 5
Theoretical Incident Detection
A theoretical assessment was also made, using criteria arrived at by consensus, of the potential value of the oxygen analyser in detecting all relevant incidents had the oxygen analyser been used on its own, and had the incident been allowed to evolve. 5 For this assessment it was assumed that the oxygen analyser would have been used from before pre-oxygenation until the patient was no longer breathing gas from the anaesthetic machine or circuit. It was assumed that the "high" alarm was set at 99070 and the "low" alarm at 19% and that the sensor was situated in the in-
Figure 1
The role of the oxygen analyser in patients undergoing general anaesthesiaa, ranked by the number of times an oxygen analyser first detected an incident. 
SV = spontaneous ventilation
spiratory limb of the circle system, or distal to the common gas outlet with a "T-piece' '.
RESULTS
The information of relevance to the oxygen analyser from the paper in this symposium on the role of monitors in the 1256 incidents which occurred in association with patients undergoing general anaesthesia 5 (GA incidents) is summarised in Figure 1 .
Actual Incident Detection
Of the 1256 GA incidents, 604 were "human detected" and 652 were "monitor detected"; the oxygen analyser was ranked seventh and detected 25 (4070) of these monitor detected GA incidents (see Figure 2 , p.536).5
The oxygen analyser was considered to have failed or caused problems in eight cases. In four cases it gave misleading readings and had to be disregarded. It caused leaks in the circuit in three cases and in one case caused a total obstruction of the respiratory circuit. There were five further incidents in which the oxygen analyser would have detected the incident had the alarms not been disabled.
Theoretical Incident Detection
In a theoretical analysis of these 1256 GA incidents it was considered that the oxygen analyser, used on its own, would have detected 114 (9.0070), had they been allowed to evolve (3070 before any potential for organ damage) (see Figure 3 , p. 537).5
DISCUSSION
Actual Incident Detection
Of the 1256 GA incidents 25 were first detected by the oxygen analyser; these represent 4070 of the 652 incidents which were first detected by a monitor in this group (see Figure 1 ).
Leak of ventilator-driving-gas into the circuit. The most common incident detected by the oxygen analyser was entrainment of ventilator-driving-gas into the breathing circuit, leading to an increased oxygen concentration in the circuit. There were 14 of these incidents; in 12 of these an oxygen analyser was in use and it first detected 10 of them. The high pressure alarm and the gas analyser each first detected two of the remainder. Entrainment of oxygen is relatively frequent, comprising over 1070 of all GA incidents (see Table 4 , p.538). 5 As awareness may occur during the normal conduct of anaesthesia, 6 it may be prudent in the current climate of increasing litigation to incorporate the oxygen analyser readouts in the anaesthetic record.
Hypoxic mixture due to rotameter setting. Delivery of hypoxic gas mixtures due to the wrong rotameter setting was the second most common incident detected by the oxygen analyser; it was reported 16 times and ranks equal nineteenth amongst the GA incidents (see Table 4 , p. 538).5 However, the oxygen analyser first detected only 6 of these 16 incidents and was in use in only 11 of them (see Figure 1 ). Four were first detected by the pulse oximeter and the remaining six were "human detected". In Table 1 the 5 incidents are listed in which the oxygen analyser was in use but did not detect the changed rotameter settings. Some recurring problems arise.
These are: -the oxygen analyser not being used when it should have been (see Figure 2 , p. 536) 5 -alarms with volume controls being adjusted by people other than the anaesthetist -oxygen analysers and/or their alarms being turned off during pre-oxygenation because of the distraction the "high" alarm causes -there being no difference in tone between the "high" oxygen alarm and the "low" oxygen alarm. Hypoxic mixtures due to rotameter settings in which an oxygen analyser was in use but did not detect the incident Incident Patient inadvertently given 100070 nitrous oxide at the end of the procedure.
Patient inadvertently given 100070 nitrous oxide at end of the procedure.
Oxygen rotameter knocked to "off" position.
Anaesthetist discovered reduced flow on the rotameter setting.
Anaesthetist turned nitrous oxide on instead of oxygen for pre-oxygenation.
Comments
Oxygen analyser alarmed. Initially ignored by the anaesthetist who assumed the alarm (as usual) indicated a "high" oxygen concentration. Eventually alerted by oximeter alarm. Unknown to anaesthetist the oxygen analyser alarm volume had been turned down. Eventually alerted by oximeter alarm. Theatre sister had taken roll of tape from the bottom of the rotameter block. Noticed by anaesthetist immediately. Anaesthetist assumed knob had been knocked; rotameter knobs noted to be excessively "free?' The oxygen analyser alarm had been turned off during preoxygenation. Alerted by oximeter alarm. The oxygen analyser read 8070.
Oxygen analyser read 2070. Anaesthetist thought the oxygen analyser was faulty. The oximeter alarmed and a nurse pointed out that the nitrous oxide was on.
The last point is well illustrated by the incident in which the anaesthetist unwittingly gave 100070 nitrous oxide during emergence and ignored the "low" alarm as he assumed it was indicating "high", as it always does at the end of a case. Design alterations and modifications to existing oxygen analysers are urgently indicated. It is debatable as to whether there should be a volume control on any important alarm. Oxygen analyser alarms should have differing tones for "high" and "low" oxgen concentrations, and a three-minute "mute" facility should be provided for the "high" alarm. This may also help to ensure that the patient receives a full three-minute pre-oxygenation.
Problems with ventilation. The oxygen analyser detected one circuit disconnection at the common gas outlet during spontaneous ventilation, one disconnection and one leak at the common gas outlet during artificial ventilation, and one total failure of ventilation. Circuit disconnections are discussed in more detail elsewhere in this symposium; 7 those occurring at or before the common gas outlet are particularly difficult to detect.
The oxygen analyser also detected two partial failures to ventilate due to low pressure leaks. One leak was caused by a deflated endotracheal cuff during low flow anaesthesia and the other leak was caused by a disconnection between the endotracheal tube and the Magill connector. The change in pressure caused by these leaks was not sufficent to trigger the low pressure alarm.
Low Nitrous Oxide Concentations. There were eight incidents in which the nitrous oxide ran out or concentrations were lower than intended. The oxygen analyser was in use in six of these incidents and detected two of them (Figure 1) . In one incident the oxygen analyser alarm had been turned off and the incident was detected by the anaesthetist; in the other three the anaesthetist detected a change in the rotameter setting before noticing an increased oxygen concentration on the oxygen analyser. A pulse oximeter detected one of the two incidents in which an oxygen analyser was not in use.
Others. In one incident the sensor of the oxygen analyser became dislodged and caused a total obstruction of the breathing circuit. In another the oxygen analyser detected a higher than intended nitrous oxide concentration due to a faulty nitrous oxide regulator.
Oxgen supply failure. There were seven incidents in which the oxygen supply failed; four of these were detected by a pulse oximeter and three by the anaesthetist. These are listed in Table 2 . Three of these involved cylinders and four incidents were due to failure of the piped gas supply. Oxygen analysers were not being used on four occasions (in all of these the pulse Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Vol. 21, No. 5, October, 1993 oximeter came to the rescue) and the incident was noticed by the anaesthetist on three. Failures of oxygen supply upstream of the rotameter.
Incident
During electroconvulsive therapy, a nurse turned the oxygen off, unknown to anaesthetist. Oxygen connection hose severed by moving anaesthetic machine over it. Disconnection of 02 supply hose at machine end. Piped gas supply failed.
Failed cylinder oxygen supply due to faulty seal on bayonet fitting. 02 cylinder ran out during transfer of a patient to theatre. Oxygen dependent patient breathing spontaneously on 1000,10 oxygen. Air and oxygen pipe-lines "switched" by engineers during servicing. 02 saturation dropped to 600,10. Oxygen analyser brought in ( not in use because deemed to be old and unreliable) and read 11 0,10. Cylinders were attached and the saturation rose to 980,10.
Method of detection
Theoretical incident detection
In the theoretical analysis of the 1256 GA incidents it was concluded that the oxygen analyser, had it been used on its own, would have detected 114 (9.0%) had they been allowed to evolve (Figure 3 , p. 537). 5 Although there may be a substantial time-lag before an oxygen analyser detects an incident (particularly with low fresh gas flows), in one-third of these cases the incident would have been detected before any physiological insult to the patient.
The oxygen l,lnalyser was considered to alert the anaesthetist late for disconnections at or before the common gas outlet during spontaneous ventilation, for disconnections and leaks at or before the common gas outlet during artificial ventilation, for nitrous oxide depletions, and for "hyperoxic" gas delivery (see Table  2 , p. 536). 5 With respect to the appropriateness of the monitoring "conventions" applied to each of the clinical situations for the theoretical analysis of the role of the oxygen analyser in the GA incidents, it would seem that the decisions made were reasonable (see Table 5 , p. 540). 5 The oxygen analyser first detected 20 (84010) of the 25 GA incidents in which it was expected to do so. In two cases the oxygen analyser first detected a problem when it had been defined to do so only after another monitor, and in three cases it detected an incident when it was not defined to do so. Two of these incidents were low pressure leaks in which the drop in pressure was insufficient to set off low pressure alarms, and in one the oxygen analyser was the cause of the incident (the sensor was dislodged and totally obstructed the breathing circuit.)
Limitations of the oxygen analyser
In three incidents the oxygen analyser itself caused a leak. This was due either to the sensor falling out or to faulty seating of the O-ring on the "T-tube". In four incidents the oxygen analyser was disregarded after it was thought to be giving inappropriate readings; on each occasion this was confirmed by re-calibration.
In five incidents it was reported that the oxygen analyser was in circuit but either the monitor itself or the alarms had been switched off. This was often due to the irritation the "high" alarm causes when it "sounds" during pre-oxygenation and emergence.
CONCLUSIONS
If an anaesthetist elects to use an artificial gas, then he or she has a responsibility to ensure that the patient will not be supplied with a hypoxic mixture. Commercially available oxygen analysers have been shown to be reliable and to generally "fail-safe" if correctly sited and properly used. 8 An oxygen analyser should always be used, should be calibrated and the alarms should be checked before use. In spite of the recommendations of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists, oxygen analysers are used less than two thirds of the time (Figure 2 , p. 536).5 When they are, all too frequently the alarm has been disabled, sometimes by a person other than the anaesthetist responsible for the patient. This seems to be due largely to the inappropriate design of the "high" alarm, which is intrusive and irritating during pre-oxygenation and emergence. There is an urgent need for the high alarm either to be disabled and the read-out to be documented at 5-minute intervals, or for it to have a different tone from the low alarm and a three-minute "mute facility". The latter would be preferable; the former may be achieved simply by setting the "high" alarm at 99010.
Failure of the oxygen supply and the delivery of a hypoxic mixture still occurs surprisingly frequently. These can rapidly lead to a catastrophic outcome, particularly if the patient receives 100010 nitrous oxide. We are in full agreement with the recommendations of the Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists 2 and with those in the" International Standards for a Safe Practice of Anaesthesia' '. J Each anaesthetic machine should be equipped with an oxygen supply failure alarm. Rotameter banks should be fitted with devices which prevent the administration of an hypoxic mixture. A suitable, correctly sited oxygen analyser should be available, checked, calibrated and correctly used with every case in which the patient breathes gas from an anaesthetic machine or circuit.
